Public vs authorised view record: what each reader sees in the same passport

A battery passport is one record with more than one view. Annex XIII points 1 to 4 assign information to audiences: point 1 to the general public, point 2 to persons with a legitimate interest and the Commission, point 3 to notified bodies, market surveillance authorities and the Commission, and point 4 to persons with a legitimate interest for individual battery information. The same scan therefore produces a public view and an authorised view that differ in depth, not in identity. Both views refer to the same battery, the same model and the same unique identifier. Difference in depth must not become difference in facts.

What must the public view contain?

The public view contains point 1 model information: general battery information, composition in summary form, carbon footprint and recycled content information where applicable, performance and durability information in summary, marking and conformity information, and waste prevention and management information. The public view must be complete on its own terms. A member of the public who scans a battery should be able to establish what the battery is, who made it, what model it belongs to, what its rated characteristics are, and where waste information can be found, without needing authorised access. A public view that shows only an identifier and a prompt to log in fails that test. Completeness does not mean full detail. Summary composition is complete as a summary when it states the chemistry family and the materials information that point 1 requires, without publishing the detailed composition reserved to point 2.

What does the authorised view add?

The authorised view adds point 2 model detail, point 4 unit history, and, for the authority audience, point 3 test reports. Detailed composition, including materials used in cathode, anode and electrolyte, part numbers for components and sources for replacement spares, dismantling information and safety measures appear in the authorised view. Unit level performance values, state of health, status changes and use phase events appear there too. The authorised view does not replace the public view. It extends it. Every figure in the public view should appear identically in the authorised view, with the same value, the same scope note and the same date. A discrepancy between views undermines trust in both, because a reader cannot tell which view is current. Systems should therefore draw both views from one record, with access rules applied at display, rather than maintaining two separate copies of the data.

How are the views kept consistent?

Consistency is kept by single sourcing. One field, one value, one version, with access rules deciding visibility. Where a field is restricted, the public view shows that a restricted field exists in general terms or omits it cleanly, depending on the system design, but never shows a substitute value. Where a field is updated, both views update together, because there is only one underlying record. Where a correction is made, the correction appears in every view that shows the field, with the same version note. Testing for consistency means scanning as a public reader and as an authorised reader and comparing every shared field. A shared field that differs between views is a defect in the record system, not a difference in access policy. The table below sets out the comparison a tester makes.

What must never leak between views?

Detailed composition, dismantling sequences, part numbers and test reports must not appear in the public view through a summary, a file name, a preview image or a search index entry. Leakage is often indirect: a document title that reveals a supplier, an image alt text that reveals a cell layout, or a URL that exposes a restricted file. The public view must be tested as a stranger would test it, by scanning, by searching, and by inspecting what the page loads. A second form of leakage runs in the other direction. Public information must not be hidden from authorised readers on the ground that it is already public. Authorised readers need the public summary in context, alongside the detail, to interpret the detail correctly. Access control is about who sees restricted depth, not about fragmenting the record into unrelated pieces.

How should a reader describe what was seen?

What happens when a field changes tier or status?

A field can move between visibility states when a status change, a correction or a new delegated act changes what Annex XIII requires to be shown. The record must handle that move as a version event, with a date and a note, not as a silent disappearance or appearance. A field that was public and becomes restricted should leave a trace in the version history for authorised readers, so that a reader who relied on the earlier public value can understand the change. A field that was restricted and becomes public should appear with the same value and scope note that authorised readers already saw. Tier changes are rare, and rarity makes them easy to mishandle. The test is whether a reader comparing two dated views can explain every difference from the version history alone, without asking the operator for an explanation that the record should already contain.

A reader describing a passport should name the view. A statement that a dismantling diagram was absent means something different when the reader saw only the public view. The description should state the tier, the date of viewing, and the identifier checked, so that a later reader can repeat the check. This discipline matters in second hand sales, repair assessments and recycling decisions, where a statement based on the public view is sometimes quoted as if it covered the full record. The record itself should support that discipline by labelling the view in the display, so that a screenshot or a printout carries its tier with it. This guide gives general educational information only and does not give legal advice for a particular battery, record system or access decision.